Convocada por diferentes estudiosos de los Padres de la Iglesia y del cristianismo antiguo en Latinoamérica, a saber, los profesores Ana Cristina Villa Betancourt, Andrés Mauricio Quevedo Rodríguez y Estiven Valencia Marín, de Colombia; Alejandro Nicola y Francisco Basttita-Harriet, de Argentina; Bruno Gripp, de Brasil; Pamela Chávez Aguilar, de Chile; y Jesús Ma. Aguiñaga Fernández, de México.

Axel Honneth is, without a doubt, heir to a tradition of social and political thought that was decisive in the Marxist debates of the 20th century; critical theory. As an outstanding disciple of Jürgen Habermas, he denounced a sociological deficit in his teacher's theory of communicative action, while continuing a certain recovery of Hegel that Habermas made evident in his text: Work and interaction: notes on Hegelian philosophy of the Jena period (1986). Honneth deepened the Hegelian reading of Habermas, going (...) from mere reading notes to a system of understanding the social based on recognition and ethics. (shrink)

El presente artículo plantea que el uso de la noción de hegemonía en la argumentación sobre el populismo y su capacidad democratizante en la obra de Ernesto Laclau implica un rezago antidemocrático que resta potencial emancipador y de ampliación de la participación política. La argumentación de Laclau incluye como horizonte ineludible de la articulación de un movimiento populista la formación de una hegemonía que sea capaz de disputar el poder político y que configure una ‘cadena de equivalencias’ entre ‘demandas sociales (...) insatisfechas’. En consecuencia, el presente artículo revisa dos frentes de crítica a la argumentación de Laclau sobre la hegemonía en el populismo: uno que proviene de la academia estadounidense y es liderado por Alberto Moreiras y Jon Beasly Murray y otro que viene de la sociología argentina con la interactuó Laclau: Aboy Carlés y Emilio de Ipola. El sentido de revisar estás críticas es repensar el populismo sin hegemonía para hallar un camino que supere las dificultades que desde distintos frentes se endilgan a la obra de Laclau. La hipótesis que se presenta como alternativa es que una vez desprendido de la noción de hegemonía, el populismo se puede recategorizar en torno a su capacidad de solución a demandas insatisfechas y ampliación de participación política institucional en lo que llamaré ‘populismo transformativo’. (shrink)

En este artículo se propone un desarrollo esquemático del concepto de paridad participativa de Nancy Fraser como elemento complementario a la propuesta de democratizar la democracia de Étienne Balibar que se inscribe en la dialéctica de la igualibertad como marco de interpretación de la modernidad política. Se mostrará que el neoliberalismo implica un evento particular en el desarrollo de la lucha por la igualibertad anulando el contenido insurreccional de ésta y por tanto, dificultando una perspectiva democratizadora que, en la visión (...) del autor francés, requiere recuperar la conflictividad política iniciada en la Revolución francesa en torno a la igualibertad. La paridad participativa, se argumentará, cumple los requisitos que exige la visión de Balibar y, la interpretación particular de la misma que se expondrá serviría como elementos básicos para democratizar la democracia. (shrink)

Purpose driven companies have developed their corporate culture with a commitment to stakeholders, Sustainable Development Goals, and social responsibility, prioritizing the management of organizational intangibles over capital. The overall objective of this research is to gain knowledge regarding the attention and emotional intensity registered by young Spanish university students when visualizing corporate purpose versus corporate visual identity, as well as the image of the Chairman of the main Spanish companies quoted on the IBEX 35. The techniques of eye tracking and (...) galvanic skin response have been used with 31 Spanish university students. The results suggest that brands with the highest brand equity in the Interbrand ranking are also the ones that receive the highest levels of attention and emotional arousal, and that a well-formulated corporate purpose is not enough to satisfy the public if company credibility is low due to previous perceptions of an organization. (shrink)

Distance education offers flexibility and accessibility to students with diverse needs and contexts. However, it is crucial to understand the factors that motivate students to choose this educational modality, especially in programs like Public Accounting, which require specific skills. The general objective of this article is to analyze the determinants in the decision to study the Public Accounting Program in a distance or virtual modality at the National Open and Distance University (UNAD). A mixed methodology is employed, supported by authors (...) such as Creswell (2014), combining quantitative and qualitative data, and using the Probit model to identify factors influencing this choice. A significant finding is that tuition cost, the Saber 11 test score and parents' education are significant variables affecting students' decisions, with tuition cost having the greatest influence on the probability of choice. (shrink)

Review of Salles, R.; Molina Ayala, J. Alejandro de Afrodisia. _De la mixtura y el crecimiento_.

Teacher quality, its effect on students’ outcomes, and the association of these with economic growth, is the core of recent discussions in Latin America given the region’s weak results in international learning assessments. This paper investigates whether there is an effect of philosophy on the outcomes of critical reading for students in B.Ed. programs in Colombia. Relying on exact matching combined with propensity score matching with regression adjustment, we use national data from Colombia to show that students in B.Ed. in (...) philosophy outperformed students in other B.Ed. in critical reading test (0.401–0.124 SD), and, importantly, with higher effects observed for students with lower prior academic achievement (0.44 SD). This suggests that philosophy can help to narrow educational outcomes of students whose socioeconomic conditions are disadvantageous, contributing to social justice in education. (shrink)

Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, (...) on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of intentionality, ‘no’. (shrink)

Proponents of enactivism should be interested in exploring what notion of action best captures the type of action-perception link that the view proposes, such that it covers all the aspects in which our doings constitute and are constituted by our perceiving. This article proposes and defends the thesis that the notion of sensorimotor dependencies is insufficient to account for the reality of human perception, and that the central enactive notion should be that of perceptual practices. Sensorimotor enactivism is insufficient because (...) it has no traction on socially dependent perceptions, which are essential to the role and significance of perception in our lives. Since the social dimension is a central desideratum in a theory of human perception, enactivism needs a notion that accounts for such an aspect. This article sketches the main features of the Wittgenstein-inspired notion of perceptual practices as the central notion to understand perception. Perception, I claim, is properly understood as woven into a type of social practices that includes food, dance, dress, music, etc. More specifically, perceptual practices are the enactment of culturally structured, normatively rich techniques of commerce of meaningful multi- and inter-modal perceptible material. I argue that perceptual practices explain three central features of socially dependent perception: attentional focus, aspects’ saliency, and modal-specific harmony-like relations. (shrink)

On a view implicitly endorsed by many, a concept is epistemically better than another if and because it does a better job at ‘carving at the joints', or if the property corresponding to it is ‘more natural' than the one corresponding to another. This chapter offers an argument against this seemingly plausible thought, starting from three key observations about the way we use and evaluate concepts from en epistemic perspective: that we look for concepts that play a role in explanations (...) of things that cry out for explanation; that we evaluate not only ‘empirical' concepts, but also mathematical and perhaps moral concepts from an epistemic perspective; and that there is much more complexity to the concept/property relation than the natural thought seems to presuppose. These observations, it is argued, rule out giving a theory of conceptual evaluation that is a corollary of a metaphysical ranking of the relevant properties. -/- conceptual ethics, explanation, naturalness, epistemic value, concept/property, semantic internalism. (shrink)

Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...) claim about epistemic value—what I label ‘Downwards Propriety’—much stronger than any they have offered justification. The second part of this paper offers an argument that this challenge cannot be met: that there is no hope for providing a purely axiological justification of Downwards Propriety, at least given widely accepted assumptions about epistemic value. (shrink)

Las siguientes páginas versan sobre la propuesta humanista de nueva ilustración (Aufklärung) de José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) en Misión de la Universidad (1930), una obra donde el filósofo enfatiza el valor de una cultura de humanidades o cultura general que, como sistema de ideas sobre el mundo y la humanidad impulsaron las universidades medievales y que se necesita recuperar para contrarrestar la barbarie del especialismo o el terrorismo de los laboratorios que invade la universidad. En un mundo global que (...) cada vez reclama una mayor atención a la interdisciplinariedad para comprender mejor los asuntos que más nos conciernen y que no son otros que los plenamente humanos, la universidad juega un rol fundamental, debiendo potenciar el estudio de las humanidades pues, como dice Ortega, la espléndida palabra «humanidades» designa las disciplinas todas que se ocupan del conjunto de los hechos exclusivamente humanos. (shrink)

In Part I of this series [A. Poveda, A. Rinot and D. Sinapova, Sigma-Prikry forcing I: The axioms, Canad. J. Math. 73(5) (2021) 1205–1238], we introduced a class of notions of forcing which we call [Formula: see text]-Prikry, and showed that many of the known Prikry-type notions of forcing that center around singular cardinals of countable cofinality are [Formula: see text]-Prikry. We showed that given a [Formula: see text]-Prikry poset [Formula: see text] and a [Formula: see text]-name for a non-reflecting (...) stationary set [Formula: see text], there exists a corresponding [Formula: see text]-Prikry poset that projects to [Formula: see text] and kills the stationarity of [Formula: see text]. In this paper, we develop a general scheme for iterating [Formula: see text]-Prikry posets and, as an application, we blow up the power of a countable limit of Laver-indestructible supercompact cardinals, and then iteratively kill all non-reflecting stationary subsets of its successor. This yields a model in which the singular cardinal hypothesis fails and simultaneous reflection of finite families of stationary sets holds. (shrink)

I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual development. Second, (...) it should be able to underlie the vast diversity of human beings within and across communities. As possible candidates, I contrast position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the one hand, and customary habits, on the other. I argue that position-taking represents the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. A subject’s position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. I conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to passivity. (shrink)

This introduction to this collection of essays presents diverse perspectives on social identities, inviting readers to reconsider established notions and explore new approaches to understanding these complex social phenomena. The contributions challenge traditional philosophical boundaries, intersecting ontological, epistemological, ethical, and political considerations. // The authors situate different views on the ontology of social identities within some extant options. Thus, they contrast their "social identity affordance view" with two alternative approaches: the Cambridge Social Ontology group's positioning theory and Weichold & Thonhauser's (...) broad conception of social identities. Their view understands social identities as realities that structure social life and shape individuals' self-conceptions, emphasizing the importance of historical contingency and social context. // The introduction then proceeds to review the contributions to the volume. The volume comprises three sections: "Experiences of Social Identities," exploring how specific identities are understood and experienced; "Horizons of Social Identities," examining how identities develop and change over time; and "Some Frameworks of Social Identities," presenting alternative frameworks for conceptualizing social identities. (shrink)

Why should we recognize people's freedom to bequeath? In this article, I argue that bequeathing should be considered a basic liberty within John Rawls' scheme of justice. To do so, I begin by identifying the characteristics of the interests protected by the basic liberties. These interests are linked to the exercise or development of the two moral powers of persons, must belong to the holder of the right or freedom, and can only be limited by the externalities arising from the (...) exercise of other fundamental interests. Subsequently, I address whether the interest covered by the right to bequeath meets these criteria. Finally, I conclude by establishing that the power to bequeath is a basic liberty that protects the interest of its holder in being partial and that can only be limited if its exercise undermines other fundamental liberties. (shrink)

Intellectual progress involves forming a more accurate picture of the world. But it also figuring out which concepts to use for theorizing about the world. Bayesian epistemology has had much to say about the former aspect of our cognitive lives, but little if at all about the latter. I outline a framework for formulating questions about conceptual change in a broadly Bayesian framework. By enriching the resources of Epistemic Utility Theory with a more expansive conception of epistemic value, I offer (...) a picture of our cognitive economy on which adopting new conceptual tools can sometimes be epistemically rational. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a reconstruction of Aristotle's discussion of incontinence, which stresses the relevant aspects from the point of view of a virtue ethics, focusing as a such not primarily on particular actions but on habitual dispositions of character. The paper emphasizes also the connection between Aristotle's account of incontinence and his conception of practical rationality, especially the issue concerning the temporal dimension of practical reason.

Most discussions of Rawls’s philosophy tend to neglect the strong communitarian strand of his theory: so much so that in the debate between liberals and communitarians Rawls’s account of community has been for the most part intriguingly absent. This article is an attempt to fill in the gap by offering a discussion of the Rawlsian understanding of community as it was presented in A Theory of Justice and its possible implications for a pluralist society. At the same time, I want (...) to take issue with one of the most influential critiques leveled against Rawls’s conception of the self: namely, Sandel’s critique of the ‘individuated subject’ that, in his view, underlies justice as fairness. Rawls’s constructions, so Sandel argues, rest on an unencumbered self that is individuated in advance and whose identity is fixed once and for all. (shrink)

El presente trabajo examina la crítica de Heidegger a la concepción kantiana de la libertad como un tipo peculiar de causa. Con ella Kant consuma tendencias operantes en una larga tradición, cuyos orígenes remontan a la ontología griega, que documenta la comprensión del ser como presencia. Pero el enfoque causal de la libertad no permite hacer justicia a sus raíces más profundas en la propia trascendencia del Dasein.

This paper addresses the methodological priority of the constitutive features of personal identity over those of identification or reidentification. In this context, it studies the role of habits as basics constitutive determinants of the empirical ego. It deals with the Kantian lack of attention to the relation between the subject and the world opened by human action. Then, it studies the treatment of this topic in Aristotle and Husserl, focused on two themes: habits and temporality.

Applied behavior analysis (ABA) has featured an increasing concern for understanding and considering the cultural diversity of the populations behavior analysts serve in recent years. As an expression of that concern, the new BACB’s Ethics Code for Behavior Analysts is more explicit and comprehensive in its inclusion of ethical obligations concerning cultural diversity. The purpose of this paper is to offer a discussion on the limitations of both our capacity and willingness to know and overcome our ignorance about our own (...) and other cultures. We examine different ways in which our ignorance of other cultures plays out even in willful compliance with the BACB ethics code. We suggest part of the problem is that the BACB ethics code seems to operate under the assumption that practitioners are always aware or can be aware of what they do not know and their biases. In contrast, we offer a reflection on a more complex picture of our understanding of ourselves and other cultures where we cannot assume people are aware of what they ignore and of their biases. Ethically, we find that in some cases these blindspots are accounted for by the BACB ethics code and should be foreseen and addressed by the behavior analyst (BA). But in other cases, when a person is not aware of what they ignore, understanding the connection between cultural diversity ignorance and professional behavior requires a different approach. Our analysis suggests an attitude of being thoughtfully diligent and humble while learning about cultural diversity issues and examining the areas where we might be ignorant and not aware of our ignorance. We argue that BAs’ obligations to respect the dignity of clients and their families and to provide effective treatment call for this attitude of diligence and humility that goes beyond mere compliance. (shrink)

Epistemic rationality is typically taken to be immodest at least in this sense: a rational epistemic state should always take itself to be doing at least as well, epistemically and by its own light, than any alternative epistemic state. If epistemic states are probability functions and their alternatives are other probability functions defined over the same collection of proposition, we can capture the relevant sense of immodesty by claiming that epistemic utility functions are (strictly) proper. In this paper I examine (...) what happens if we allow for the alternatives to an epistemic state to include probability functions with different domains. I first prove an impossibility result: on minimal assumptions, I show that there is no way of vindicating strong immodesty principles to the effect that any probability function should take itself to be doing at least as well than any alternative probability function, regardless of its domain. I then consider alternative, weaker generalizations of the traditional immodesty principle and prove some characterization results for some classes of epistemic utility functions satisfying each of the relevant principles. (shrink)

Traditionally, corruption is seen as a rational pursuit of profit, focusing on personal gain. However, this view overlooks behavioral, social, and systemic influences. This paper focuses on the behavioral aspects of corruption, providing a deeper understanding of its complexities by addressing the factors overlooked by conventional approaches. Reviewing some of the literature, we highlight how researchers have approached the study of corruption from the perspective of behavioral sciences. Additionally, we examine how the emerging discipline of Behavioral Public Policy (BPP) employs (...) innovative methods to reduce corrupt practices, offering new insights and strategies that transcend traditional approaches. The core contribution of our paper lies in its novel approach: showing a path for corruption decrease by replacing traditional regulations and bureaucratic burdens, which research shows can increase its likelihood, with non-regulatory behavioral tools such as nudges and sludge audits. By reducing regulations and administrative red tape, these tools simplify processes minimizing opportunities for corrupt behavior in certain contexts, while aligning with liberal principles. In this article, we aim to infuse corruption research with a behavioral twist and a liberal perspective, offering policymakers alternative strategies to foster transparency, accountability, and ethical governance. While this approach will not completely eradicate corruption, it strives to show how BPP can reduce its occurrences. (shrink)

RESUMENEste trabajo busca establecer cuál es el remanente idealista de la razón pública que pervive en el intento infructuoso de superar el idealismo absoluto limitando la razón que debe encargarse de construir el consenso no-excluyente por superposición. Como alternativa se propone pensar un nuevo tipo de consenso, eventual e inestable, que exija- y aquí estaría latente el otro idealismo no absoluto del de Leonberg- una comunicación constante basada en el diálogo inagotable del que nazcan normas concretas de conducta consensuadas pero (...) eventuales.PALABRAS CLAVESCONSENSUS EVENTUEL, KOMMUNIKATIVE VERNUNFT, RECEVABILITE, PUBLIC REASON.ABSTRACTThis paper want to establish the idealist remains of public reason, showing that absolute idealism can not be overcome by limiting the reason, that must build the nonexclusionary consensus by overlapping, but instead proposing like aim a new type of consensus, eventual and unstable, which would require, and here would be latent the other non-absolute idealism of Leonberg, a constant communication based on infinite dialogue that giving cause for specific rules of conduct, agreed but reviewable.KEY WORDSCONSENSUS EVENTUEL, KOMMUNIKATIVE VERNUNFT, RECEVABILITE, PUBLIC REASON. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta y defiende una concepción expresiva del mundo perceptual que depende de la intersubjetividad. En un primer momento se muestra el desarrollo del concepto de expresión en Husserl y en Merleau-Ponty. El punto central de este desarrollo es que, en contraste con la concepción tradicional del concepto de expresión que es lingüística y consiste en el manifestarse exteriormente de algo interno, se propone ahora una idea de expresión que ya no separa radicalmente lo expresado de la expresión, no (...) se concibe como traducción, y se aplica a la relación entre subjetividad y corporalidad. Para ajustar la aplicación de la expresión a la percepción, se argumenta que las apariencias perceptuales requieren de una cualificación en términos de la posición o perspectiva del sujeto que percibe. Esta “posición” o perspectiva no es únicamente espacio-temporal, sino que también es pragmática. Finalmente, se introduce la intersubjetividad, entendida pragmáticamente, a través de la idea de que hay maneras de explorar el mundo con los sentidos que son constituidas socialmente por los diferentes grupos sociales de los que hacemos parte. Se argumenta que esta concepción pragmatista, diferente a la ruta predominante en fenomenología basada en el significado como un asunto de conciencia de la experiencia, también es defendible en el terreno fenomenológico, particularmente a través de la noción husserliana de toma de posición (Stellungnahme) y la idea merleau-pontiana de las maneras de interrogar el mundo perceptualmente. -/- This article presents and defends an expressive and intersubjectively dependent conception of the perceptual world. The first section deals with the phenomenological development of the concept of expression in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. In this development, and in contrast with the traditional conception of expression –a linguistic conception based on the external manifesting of something inner–, a new conception appears: one that doesn’t keep a hard separation between the expression and what is expressed, is not modeled after translation, and can be applied to the relationship between subjectivity and corporeality. To further precise the way expression and perception fit together, I argue that perceptual appearances require being qualified in terms of the position or perspective of the perceiving subject. This “position” or perspective is not only spatiotemporal but also pragmatic. Lastly, a pragmatically understood intersubjectivity is brought into play. I look at the fact that there are different ways of exploring the world with our senses that are socially constituted. This constitution takes places in and through the different social groups to which we belong. I argue that this pragmatist conception, while different from the dominant phenomenological understanding that takes meaning to be about the consciousness of experiences, is also defensible on phenomenological grounds. This alternative understanding finds support in Husserl’s idea of position-taking (Stellungnahme) and Merleau-Ponty’s claim that there exist different ways of interrogating the world perceptually. (shrink)

Los desencuentros de la filosofía latinoamericana con Nietzsche pueden entenderse como un síntoma de algo más que un problema de legibilidad o malentendido. En tanto pensamiento de lo uno, la filosofía latinoamericana (mayoritaria) no puede servirse del pensamiento nietzscheano: es imposi-ble construir un pensamiento del origen y la unidad desde un pensamiento de lo múltiple, como el de Nietzsche. La identidad, tan buscada por esa filosofía latinoamericana mayoritaria, es una ansiedad antigenealógica. En ese sentido, esa filosofía y su procedencia no (...) es solo eurocéntrica, como ya ha sido expuesto por otros comentaristas, sino reactiva, y esto vale para tres de sus tendencias principa-les: la filosofía normalizadora, la corriente historicista y la filosofía latinoamericana de la liberación. De ahí, de paso, la fascinación de dicho pensamiento con la idea de carencia —nunca hemos sido lo suficientemente civilizados—. Esto ha instaurado un cuerpo sufriente en América Latina, atrapado en la dialéctica de la víctima y el victimario. Se trata entonces de pensar con Nietzsche para intentar pensar sin resentimiento desde América Latina y sobre esta. ¿Nietzsche en América Latina? Sí, pero más allá de los estudios de recepción e influencia: Nietzsche como aquel estruendo capaz de infundirle una dimensión geológica al pensamiento. (shrink)

The classical limit is fundamental in quantum mechanics. It means that quantum predictions must converge to classical ones as the macroscopic scale is approached. Yet, how and why quantum phenomena vanish at the macroscopic scale is difficult to explain. In this paper, quantum predictions for Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger states with an arbitrary number q of qubits are shown to become indistinguishable from the ones of a classical model as q increases, even in the absence of loopholes. Provided that two reasonable assumptions are (...) accepted, this result leads to a simple way to explain the classical limit and the vanishing of observable quantum phenomena at the macroscopic scale. (shrink)

The following pages deal with the Ortega’s anthropology. I’m going to offer the Ortega’s contribution to modern’s ethnography. Ortega knew and debated the anthropological ideas of his time: evolutionist, particularist, difusionist, functionalist. Adopting a historical point of view, Ortega set out the reasons for his disagreement about the dogmatic, ethnocentric, evolutionist and progressive vision of the Western Europe in connection with of the universal history. He awards enormous importance in his writings to the recognition of ethnic and cultural horizons, which (...) have been historically and traditionally forgotten, which turns him into the rigorous anthropologic theoretical one. These contributions that Ortega y Gasset realizes to the field of the anthropology in his social and cultural domain complete his reflections on the historical sense of the life and the purely vital perspective of every man and cultural society with which there deals specifically his historical and rational vital anthropology. (shrink)

This paper discusses the reception and the influence of the Critique of Judgement. It focuses on the central distinction between both fundamental types of functions in the Faculty of Judgement: the determinant and the reflexive function; it considers also its projection to the constitution of experience developed in the Critique of Pure Reason.